Détente

DISARMAMENT

5 min read

Détente

The end of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 ushered in a period of détente or easing of the relations between the two superpowers, although their arsenals—particularly intercontinental missiles and submarine-launched missiles—continued to grow for the purpose of mutual deterrence.

The Soviets' willingness to engage in dialogue with the West was facilitated by their growing rift with China, which, among other disagreements with the USSR, had criticized Moscow's handling of the Cuban crisis.

On August 5, 1963, in Moscow, the United States, USSR and United Kingdom signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Most other countries joined, with the notable exceptions of France and China, which conducted its first nuclear test the following year.

Moscow and Washington shared an interest in preventing additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons and agreed to begin negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty.

Arms Control and Strategic Parity

The Vietnam War, in which the United States became involved in a prolonged conflict against local Communist forces, did not fundamentally interrupt the trend toward détente.

Brezhnev, who succeeded Khrushchev, continued expanding the Soviet missile arsenal in order to bring its deterrent capability closer to that of the United States. Between 1964 and 1968, the number of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles increased from 191 to 1,017. At the same time, however, Brezhnev oriented Soviet foreign policy toward maintaining peace with the Americans.

In 1967, Moscow, London and Washington signed a treaty prohibiting the placement of nuclear weapons in outer space.

After the Six-Day War of June 1967 between Israel and several Arab countries allied with the Soviet Union, the United States began openly supporting Israel, which it regarded as a useful ally in its strategy of containing the USSR. The Soviets, in turn, massively strengthened Egypt and Syria and supported Egypt during the conflict in the Sinai in 1969–70.

The regional interests of the superpowers nevertheless did not undermine their fundamental objective of reducing the risk of nuclear war, particularly in view of the Chinese threat.

On July 1, 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was finally signed. Nuclear-weapon states undertook not to transfer nuclear weapons or assist non-nuclear-weapon states in acquiring them, while non-nuclear-weapon states undertook not to receive or produce such weapons. The treaty also established a system of inspections of the parties' nuclear activities.

Negotiations went further, seeking to limit both offensive weapons and anti-ballistic missile defenses. The latter could have undermined the mechanism of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD), which depended on the mutual vulnerability of the two superpowers.

On May 26, 1972, these negotiations resulted in the signing of the SALT agreement and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The former regulated the number of launch installations for strategic ballistic missiles—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—freezing them at existing or already-under-construction levels.

Technological development, however, was not restricted, allowing both sides to deploy increasing numbers of MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) capable of striking several targets with a single missile. Initially, only the Americans possessed them.

The ABM Treaty significantly limited anti-ballistic missile systems, thereby formalizing deterrence based on mutual assured destruction.

The declarations accompanying the two agreements proclaimed a “special responsibility” of the two superpowers for international security and affirmed “principles of sovereignty, equality and non-interference in internal affairs” as the basis of their relations.

They also concluded agreements on technical and cultural cooperation and opened the way for greater economic exchanges. Between 1971 and 1976, trade between the two countries increased eightfold.

Détente, however, did not eliminate the rivalry between the United States and USSR. Brezhnev described it as a way of keeping the “historically inevitable struggle [between socialism and capitalism]” on a path free from the dangers of war.

American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger similarly viewed détente not as an alternative to the Cold War, but as “a more sophisticated and less bellicose way of fighting it”.

The Crisis of American Power

During the 1970s, the United States experienced a crisis of its hegemony. The Vietnam campaign had proved disastrous, public finances were in severe deficit, and the country went through a period of economic and monetary difficulties.

Despite its highly developed industrial economy, the United States had lost its energy self-sufficiency and was becoming dependent on imported oil. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, meanwhile, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), predominantly Arab, decided to restrict production, raise prices and differentiate its supplies, imposing an embargo on the United States because of its support for Israel.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, increased its revenues through the sale of raw materials and weapons, using the proceeds to quadruple its purchases of Western technology and food.

At the same time, however, increasing contact with the West caused Soviet leaders to fear cultural influence from abroad. They therefore strengthened controls and repression both inside the USSR and throughout the Eastern bloc, drawing criticism from both conservatives and progressives in the West.

In this context, the movement of so-called neoconservatives emerged on the American left. They criticized what they regarded as the moral compromise involved in making agreements with the Soviets and abandoning American strategic superiority.

At the end of 1973, at the initiative of a Democratic senator, Congress made the implementation of trade agreements with the USSR conditional on Soviet liberalization of emigration. The measure was primarily intended to allow Soviet Jews to escape renewed antisemitism.

The Soviet Union rejected what it regarded as interference in its sovereignty and terminated the agreements. Détente had been seriously weakened.

The Rise of Neoconservatism

The situation in Europe was different. Few Europeans still perceived the Soviet Union as an immediate threat, and there was a prevailing preference for dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe. Attention was focused instead on oil and economic issues.

On August 1, 1975, in Helsinki, thirty-three European countries, including the USSR, together with the United States and Canada, signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

The signatories committed themselves to refraining from the use of force and to respecting one another's sovereignty and borders. They established terms for cooperation in technical, industrial and energy matters to promote trade, and committed themselves to respecting human rights and facilitating the movement of people and information.

Meanwhile, in November 1974 in Vladivostok, President Gerald Ford and Brezhnev had agreed, in preparation for the subsequent SALT II agreement, to an overall ceiling of 2,400 nuclear missile launchers and installations, including 1,320 capable of launching MIRVs.

The decision was opposed by critics of détente, whose central argument was that the Kremlin could not be trusted and might use agreements with Washington to secretly build strategic superiority.

In 1975, a group of experts known as Team B produced an alternative assessment of Soviet military development and strategic intentions. It argued that the Soviets were seeking superiority that would allow them to pursue their hegemonic objectives aggressively.

The idea that the United States should return to explicit dominance, justified by its moral superiority, and abandon dangerous agreements based on parity thus became a central pillar of neoconservative ideology.